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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
Comment on Recent Decisions
BANKS-LOANING MONEY AS AGENT ULTRA Vns.-The case of Porter V.
Sullivan et al. (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) 19 S. W. (2d) 372, holds that the act
of the vice-president of a bank in investing the money of a customer is
ultra vires and that the bank has no liability for the loss resulting from the
investment. The reasons advanced for the position of the court in this case
are, first, that the knowledge of an official loaning the customer's money will
not be imputed to the bank where the officer did not act within the scope of
its powers, and second, that the knowledge of the scope of the bank's powers
and authority of its officers will be chargeable to persons permitting the
vice-president to lend their money.
The plaintiff in the case had dealt with the bank before in the same man-
ner through the president who had loaned his money for him. The vice-
president assumed to perform the same task after the president's death and
the plaintiff agreed. The vice-president, however, loaned the money on se-
curity that he knew to be of no value, and the plaintiff sustained a loss. At
the basis of the court's argument is the assumption that the only function
of the modern bank is to loan money and that if it gives advice and acts as
an agent in the loaning of money for others, then it is working against its
own interest. Thus the court finds that the vice-president here acted con-
trary to the interests of the bank.
Corporate powers are of two kinds-those specifically given by the char-
ter, and those implied from the terms of the charter. "Implied powers are
those that are reasonably necessary according to the usual methods of that
particular business and are not limited to those things indispensably neces-
sary to the business, providing the benefits to be derived from the contract
are sufficiently direct and immediate. What is the usual and customary
method of operating a business is essentially a question of fact, for such
custom and usage change with time." Kasch v. Farmers' Gin Co. (Tex.
Com. App. 1928) 3 S. W. (2d) 72; Coppard v. Farmers' & Merchants' State
Bank (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) 184 S. W. 551.
The scope of implied powers is affected by the existing business methods
and customs. Competition compels a bank to give advice such as was of-
fered by the vice-president in this case. The court here assumed that the
giving of advice on loans or negotiating loans for customers was outside the
scope of its powers and proceeded to what appeared to be a logical conclu-
sion. But this assumption has no sound foundation either in the practices
and necessities of banking or in the authorities. The lending of money on
deposit for a customer is within the range of the legitimate business of a
bank, unless prohibited by its charter. Bobb v. Savings Bank of Louisville
et al. (1884) 23 Ky. Law Rep. 817, 64 S. W. 494. There was nothing in the
facts of this case to indicate that the charter of the defendant prohibited
such loans.
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It is well settled that if money is left with a bank to be loaned, the bank
is an agent and not a debtor of the depositor, but if the bank lends the
money in good faith and exercises due care, it is not liable to the customer
in the event of a pecuniary loss. Squires v. Monmouth First National Bank
(1895) 59 Ill. App. 134; Chapman v. First National Bank (1914) 72 Ore. 492,
143 Pac. 630. Those cases adhere to the view that the loaning of money for
customers is a function of a bank and hold that a bank is liable where its
officers have been negligent in giving the services or have perpetrated delib-
erate frauds. The case here, however, did not hold the bank for the act of
the officer in loaning the money of the customer even though there was neg-
ligence or fraud.
However, there are a number of cases which hold that the scope of powers
of a bank does not extend to the logning of a customer's money and thus if
an officer does so the bank will not be liable. City National Bank of Fort
Worth v. Martin (1880) 70 Tex. 643, S. W. 507. Assuming the validity of
such a view, many courts hold a corporation liable even where the act of the
corporation was admittedly ultra vires. This question arises most often in
the cases where torts have been committed by the officers or agents of a
corporation, and the corporation seeks to relieve itself of liability on the
grounds that it was not authorized by its charter to perform the act in the
course of which the tort was committed. But logically the doctrine of ultra
vires should have no application as a defense to an action for a wrong of
which the corporation is guilty. Natural persons are responsible for their
torts and so corporations should be responsible for their torts committed by
officers or agents through whom they must act. It is better general policy
to place a strong duty on the corporation to keep within its chartered powers
than to allow it to escape without liability merely because the wrongful act
is outside the scope of those powers. It would seem to be very unjust not to
allow a person injured by the intentional or negligent act of the officers or
agents of a corporation a remedy merely because the act was ultra vires.
Zinc Carbonate Co. v. First National Bank (1899) 103 Wis. 125, 79 N. W.
229; National Bank v. Graham (1879) 100 U. S. 699; First National Bank
of Decatur v. Henry (1906) 159 Ala. 367, 49 So. 97; Nims v. Mount Hermon
Boys' School (1893) 160 Mass. 177, 35 N. E. 776. However, there is a clear
conflict of authority on this question, many courts holding that if a tort is
committed by an officer or an agent of the corporation in the course of an
activity beyond the scope of its corporate powers, the defense pf ultra vires
is open to the corporation. Gunn v. Central R. R. et al. (1885) 74 Ga. 509;
Bathe v. Decatur Agicultural Society (1887) 73 Iowa 11, 34 N. W. 484.
The principal case stresses the point that knowledge of the agent is not
imputed to the corporation. But, this point has no application, for if the
act was ultra vires, knowledge is immaterial.and knowledge on the part of
the corporation is not considered where the corporation is held, whether the
act is ultra vires or not. A corporation can act only through its officer.
The court, therefore, cannot logically place its decision on the basis that the
knowledge of the officer was not to be imputed to the corporation.
M. E. S., '31.
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